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Growing concerns over the achievement of U.S. students have led to proposals to reward good teachers
and penalize (or fire) bad ones. The leading method for assessing teacher quality is "value added"
modeling (VAM), which decomposes students' test scores into components attributed to student heterogeneity
and to teacher quality. Implicit in the VAM approach are strong assumptions about the nature of the
educational production function and the assignment of students to classrooms. In this paper, I develop
falsification tests for three widely used VAM specifications, based on the idea that future teachers
cannot influence students' past achievement. In data from North Carolina, each of the VAMs' exclusion
restrictions are dramatically violated. In particular, these models indicate large "effects" of 5th grade
teachers on 4th grade test score gains. I also find that conventional measures of individual teachers'








Parallel literatures in labor economics and education adopt similar econometric strategies for
identifying the effects of ﬁrms on wages and of teachers on student test scores. Outcomes are
modeled as the sum of the ﬁrm or teacher effect, individual heterogeneity, and transitory, or-
thogonal error. The resulting estimates of ﬁrm effects are used to gauge the relative importance
of ﬁrm and worker heterogeneity in the determination of wages. In education, so-called “value
added models” (hereafter, VAMs) have been used to measure the importance of teacher qual-
ity to educational production, to assess teacher preparation and certiﬁcation programs, and as
important inputs to personnel evaluations and merit pay programs.1
All of these applications suppose that the estimates can be interpreted causally. But ob-
servational analyses can identify causal effects only under unveriﬁable assumptions about the
correlationbetweentreatmentassignment– theassignmentofstudentstoteachers, orthematch-
ing of workers to ﬁrms – and other determinants of test scores and wages. If these assumptions
do not hold, the resulting estimates of teacher and ﬁrm effects are likely to be quite misleading.
Anecdotally, assignments of students to teachers incorporate matching to take advantage
of teachers’ particular specialties, intentional separation of children who are known to interact
badly, effortson theprincipal’spart to reward favored teachers throughtheallocationofeasy-to-
teach students, and parental requests (see, e.g., Jacob and Lefgren, 2007; Monk, 1987). These
are difﬁcult to model statistically. Instead, VAMs typically impose an assumption that teacher
assignments are random conditional on a single (observed or latent) factor.
In this paper, I develop and implement tests of the exclusion restrictions of commonly-
used value added speciﬁcations. My strategy exploits the fact that future teachers and ﬁrms
cannot havecausal effects on past outcomes, whileviolationsof modelassumptionsmay lead to
apparentcounterfactual“effects”ofthisform. Bothtestscoresandwagesareseriallycorrelated,
and as a result an association between the current teacher or ﬁrm and the lagged outcome is
1On ﬁrm effects, see, e.g., Abowd and Kramarz (1999). For recent examinations of teacher effects modeling,
see Braun (2005a,b); Harris and Sass (2006); McCaffrey et al. (2003); and Wainer (2004).
2strong evidence against exogeneity with respect to the current outcome.
I examine three commonly used VAMs, two of which have direct parallels in the ﬁrm ef-
fects literature. In the simplest, most widely used VAM – which resembles the most common
speciﬁcation for ﬁrm effects – the necessary exclusion restriction is that teacher assignments
are orthogonal to all other determinants of the so-called “gain” score, the change in a student’s
test score over the course of the year. If this restriction holds, 5th grade teacher assignments
should not be correlated with students’ gains in 4th grade. Using a large micro-data set de-
scribing North Carolina elementary students, I ﬁnd that there is in fact substantial dispersion of
students’ 4th grade gains across 5th grade teachers. Students are particularly strongly sorted on
the basis of past reading gains, though there is clear evidence of sorting on math gains as well.
Because test scores exhibit strong mean reversion – and thus gains are negativelyautocorrelated
– sorting on past gains produces bias in the simple VAM’s estimates.
The other VAMs that I consider rely on different exclusion restrictions, namely that class-
room assignments are as good as random conditional on either the lagged test score or the
student’s (unobserved, but permanent) ability. I discuss how past gains can be used to test these
restrictions as well. I ﬁnd strong evidence in the data against each.
Evidently, classroom assignments respond dynamically to annual achievement in ways that
are not captured by the controls typically included in VAM speciﬁcations. To evaluate the
magnitude of the biases that assignments produce, I compare common VAMs to a saturated
model that conditions on the complete achievement history. Estimated teacher effects from the
saturated model diverge importantly from those obtained from the VAMs in common use. I
discuss how selection on unobservables is likely to produce substantial additional biases.
My estimates also point to an important substantive result. To the extent that any of the
VAMs that I consider identify causal effects, they indicate that teachers’ long-run effects are at
best weakly proxied by their immediate impacts. A teacher’s effect in the year of exposure –
the universal focus of value added analyses – is correlated only 0.3 to 0.5 with her cumulative
effect overtwo years, and even less with her effect over three years. Accountability policies that
3rely on measures of short-term value added are likely to do a poor job of rewarding the teachers
who are best for students’ longer run outcomes.
An important caveat to the empirical results is that they may be speciﬁc to North Carolina.
Students in other states or in individualschool districts might be assigned to classrooms in ways
that satisfy the assumptions required for common VAMs. And the results may not generalize to
models of ﬁrm effects on worker wages. But at the least, VAM-style analyses should attempt
to evaluate the model assumptions, perhaps with methods like those used here. Models that
rely on incorrect assumptions about the assignment of students to teachers and the matching of
workers to ﬁrms cannot support their intended uses. Policies that use VAM-based estimates in
hiring, ﬁring, and compensation decisions may reward and punish teachers for the students they
are assigned as much as for their actual effectiveness in the classroom.
Section 2 reviews prior work that uses pre-assignment variables to test exogeneity assump-
tions. Section 3 introduces the three VAMs, discusses their implicit assumptions, and describes
my proposed tests. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 presents results. Section 6 attempts
to quantify the biases that non-random classroom assignmentsproduce in VAM-based analyses.
Section 7 presents evidence on teachers’ long-run effects. Section 8 concludes.
2 Using Panel Data To Test Exclusion Restrictions
A central assumption in all econometric studies of treatment effects is that the treatment is
uncorrelated with other determinants of the outcome, conditional on covariates. Although the
assumption is ultimately untestable – the “fundamental problem of causal inference” (Holland,
1986) – the data can provide indications that it is unlikely to hold. In experiments, for exam-
ple, signiﬁcant correlations between treatment and pre-assignment variables are interpreted as
evidence that randomization was unsuccessful. Similar tests are often used in non-experimental
analyses: Researchers conducting propensity score matching studies frequently check for “bal-
ance” of covariates conditional on the propensity score (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1984), and
4analogous tests are used in regression discontinuity analyses (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008).
Panel data can be particularly useful. A correlation between treatment and some pre-
assignment variable X need not indicate bias in the estimated treatment effect if X is uncor-
related with the outcome variable of interest. But outcomes are typically correlated within
individuals over time, so an association between treatment and the lagged outcome strongly
suggests that the treatment is not exogenous with respect to post-treatment outcomes. This in-
sight has been most fully explored in the literature on the effect of job training on wages and
employment. Today’s wage or employment status is quite informative about tomorrow’s, even
after controlling for all observables. Evidence that assignment to job training is correlated with
lagged wage dynamics indicates that simplespeciﬁcations for the effect of training on outcomes
are likely to yield biased estimates (Ashenfelter, 1978). Richer models of the training assign-
mentprocess may absorb thiscorrelationwhilepermittingidentiﬁcation(Heckman et al., 1987).
But even these models may impose testable restrictions on the relationship between treatment
and the outcome history (Ashenfelter and Card, 1985; Card and Sullivan, 1988; Jacobson et
al., 1993). Of course, these sorts of tests cannot diagnose all model violations. If treatment
assignments depend on unobserved determinants of future outcomes that are uncorrelated with
the outcome history, the treatment effect estimator may be biased even though treatment is
uncorrelated with past outcomes.
In studies of teacher productivity, the multiplicity of teacher “treatments” can blur the con-
nection between value added modeling and program evaluation methods. But the utility of past
outcomes for speciﬁcation diagnostics carries over directly. Identiﬁcation of a teacher’s effect
rests on assumptions about the relationship between the teacher assignment and the other deter-
minants of future achievement, and the relationship with past achievement can be informative
about the plausibility of these assumptions.2
2Only a few studies have attempted to validate VAMs. Jacob and Lefgren (2008) and Harris and Sass (2007)
show that value added estimates are correlated with principals’ ratings of teacher performance. And Kane and
Staiger (2008) demonstrate that VAMs estimated on observational data predict teachers’ experimental effects.
These studies are extremely valuable, but they cannot rule out quantitatively important biases coming from non-
randomclassroomassignments. Theestimatedcorrelationsbetweenprincipalratingsandvalueaddedarerelatively
weak, and the Kane and Staiger experimental sample is too small (and potentially non-representative) to rule out
53 Statistical Model and Methods
3.1 Deﬁning the Problem
I take the parameter of interest in value added modeling to be the effect on a student’s test
score at the end of grade g of being assigned to a particular grade-g classroom rather than
another classroom at the same school. Later, I extend this to look at dynamic treatment effects
(that is, the effect of the grade-g classroom on the g+s score). I do not distinguish between
classroom and teacher effects, and use the terms interchangably. In the Appendix, I consider
this distinction, deﬁning a teacher’s effect as the time-invariant component of the effects of the
classrooms taught by the teacher over several years.
I am interested in whether common VAMs identify classroom effects with arbitrarily large
samples. I therefore sidestep small sample issues. Under realistic asymptotics, the number of
classrooms should rise in proportion to the number of students. If so, classroom effects are not
identiﬁed under any exogeneity restrictions: Even in the asymptotic limit, the number of stu-
dents per teacher remains ﬁnite and the sampling error in an individual teacher’s effect remains
non-trivial. I instead consider the properties of VAM estimates as the number of students grows
with the number of teachers (and classrooms) ﬁxed. If classroom effects are identiﬁed under
these unrealistic asymptotics, VAMs may be usable in compensation and retention policy with
appropriate allowances for the sampling errors that arise with ﬁnite class sizes;3 if not, these
corrections are likely to go awry.
A ﬁnal important distinction is between identiﬁcation of the variance of teacher quality and
the identiﬁcation of individual teachers’ effects. I focus exclusively on the latter. As it is im-
practical to report each of several thousand teachers’ estimated effects, I report only summaries
of their distribution across teachers. I select statistics, like the estimated standard deviation
of 5th grade teachers’ effects on students’ 4th grade achievement, that are informative about
any but the most extreme alternatives regarding classroom assignments.
3A typical approachshrinks a teacher’s estimated effect toward the populationmean in proportionto the degree
of imprecision in the estimate. The resulting empirical Bayes estimate is the best linear predictor of the teacher’s
true effect, given the noisy estimate. See, McCaffrey et al. (2003), pp. 63-68.
6whether the VAMs can identify individual teacher effects without bias.4
3.2 Data Generating Process and the Three VAMs
Following Todd and Wolpin (2003) and Harris and Sass (2006), student achievement can be
modeled as a linear, additive function of the full history of inputs received to date plus the
student’s innate ability. Separating classroom effects from other inputs, we can write the test










Here, bhgc is the effect of being in classroom c in grade h on the grade-g test score, and c(i, h)∈
{1,...,Jh} indexes the classroom to which student i is assigned in grade h. mi is individual
ability. We might expect the achievement gap between high-ability and low-ability students to
grow over time; this would correspond to tg+s > tg for each g and each s > 0. eih captures
all other inputs in grade h, including those received from the family, non-classroom peers, and
the community. It might also include developmental factors: A precocious child might have
positive es in early grades and negative es in later grades as her classmates catch up. As this
example shows, e is quite likely to be serially correlated within students across grades. Finally,
vig represents measurement error in the grade-g test relative to the student’s “true” grade-g
achievement. This is independent across grades within students.5
A convenientrestrictionon thetimepattern of classroomeffects is uniform geometricdecay,
bhg0c =bhgclg0−g for some 0≤l ≤1 and all h≤g<g0. A special case is l =1, corresponding
to perfect persistence. Although my results do not depend on these restrictions, I impose them
as needed for notational simplicity. I consider non-uniform decay in Section 7. Note that there
4Rivkin et al. (2005) develop a strategy for identifying the variance of teachers’ effects, but not the effect of
individual teachers, under weaker assumptions than are required by the VAMs described below.
5I deﬁne the b parameters to include any classroom-level component of vig and assume that vig is independent
across students in the same classroom. The Appendix discusses the use of repeated observations on teachers to
distinguish correlated errors from teachers’ true causal effects.
7is no theoretical basis for restrictions on the time pattern of non-classroom effects (i.e. on fhg).
It will be useful to adopt some simplifyingnotation. Let wig ≡å
g
h=1eihfhg be the composite
grade-g residual achievement, and let D indicate ﬁrst differences across student grades: Dbhgc ≡
bhgc−bh,g−1,c, Dtg ≡ tg−tg−1, Dwig ≡ wig−wig−1, and so on.
Tractable VAMs amount to decompositionsof Aig (or of DAig ≡Aig−Aig−1) into the current
teacher effect bggc(i,g), a student heterogeneity component, and an error assumed to be orthogo-
nal to the classroomassignment. Models differ in the form of this decomposition. In this paper I
considerthree speciﬁcations: A simpleregression of gainscores on grade and contemporaneous
classroom indicators,
VAM1: DAig = ag+bggc(i,g)+e1ig;
an augmented regression that controls for the prior year’s score,
VAM2: DAig = ag+Aig−1y +bggc(i,g)+e2ig;6
and a regression that stacks gain scores from several grades and adds student ﬁxed effects,
VAM3: DAig = ag+bggc(i,g)+mi+e3ig.
All three VAMs are widely used.7 VAM2 and VAM3 can both be seen as generalizations of
VAM1: VAM2 is equivalent to VAM1 when y = 0, while VAM3 reduces to VAM1 when
mi ≡ 0.
Despite their similarity, the three VAMs rely on quite distinct restrictions on the process by
which students are assigned to classrooms. I discuss the three in turn.
6VAM2 is more commonly speciﬁed as an equivalent model for the end-of-year score, Aig = ag +
Aig−1(y +1)+bggc(i,g)+e2ig. Relative to this, the expression in the text merely subtracts Aig−1 from each side. I
focus on the gain score version to maintain the parallel with VAM1 and VAM3.
7The most widely used VAM, the Tennessee Value Added Assessment System (TVAAS; see Sanders et al.,
1997), is speciﬁed as a mixed model for level scores that depend on the full history of classroom assignments,
but this model implies an equation for annual gain scores of the form used in VAM1. VAM2 is more widely
used in the recent economics literature. See, for example, Aaronson et al. (2007); Kane et al. (2006); Jacob and
Lefgren (2008); and Goldhaber (2007). VAM3 was proposed by Boardman and Murnane (1979), and has been
used recently by Rivkin et al. (2005); Harris and Sass (2006); Jacob and Lefgren (2008); and Boyd et al. (2007).
83.3 The gain score model (VAM1)






If we assume that teacher effects do not decay, Dbhgc = 0 for all h < g. The error term e1ig from
VAM1 then has three components:
e1ig = miDtg+Dwig+Dvig. (3)
VAM1 will yield consistent estimates of the grade-g classroom effects if and only if, for each c,
E
￿
e1ig|c(i, g) = c
￿
= 0. (4)
Differences in last year’s gains across this year’s classrooms are informative about this restric-
tion. Using (2), the average g−1 gain in classroom c is:
E
￿












The ﬁrst term is constant across c and can be neglected. The second term might vary with
c if (for example) a principal compensates for a bad teacher assignment in grade g−1 with
assignment to a better-than-average teacher in grade g. This can be absorbed by examining
the across-c(i, g) variation in DAig−1 controlling for c(i, g−1). I estimate speciﬁcations of
this form below.8 Any remaining variation across grade-g classrooms in g−1 gains, after
controlling for g−1 classroom assignments, must indicate that students are sorted into grade-g
8This strategy has zero power unless there is independent variation in c(i, g−1) and c(i, g). If students are
“streamed,” moving together with the same classmates from grade to grade, controls for c(i, g−1) will absorb all
across-c(i, g) variation. In the Tennessee STAR experiment (see Nye et al., 2004), streaming was quite common,
and in many schools there is zero independent variation in 3rd grade classroom assignments controlling for 2nd
grade assignments. This makes it impossible to distinguish the effects of 2nd and 3rd grade teachers, and prevents
the use of my test. In the observational data examined below, students are substantially reshufﬂed between grades.
9classrooms on the basis of e1ig−1.
Whether this would indicate a problem with assumption (4) depends on whether e1ig is
serially correlated. Equation (2) indicates four sources of potential serial correlation. First,
ability appears in both e1ig and e1ig−1 (unless Dtg = 0). Second, the eig process may be serially
correlated. Third, even if e is white noise, Dwig is a moving average process of order g−1
(absent strong restrictions on the f coefﬁcients). Finally, Dvig is an MA(1), degenerate only if
var(v) = 0.9
The discussion of serial correlation in e1ig helps clarify the conditions in which (4) will
likely hold. The most natural model that is consistent with (4) is for assignments to depend
only on student ability, mi, and for ability to have the same effect on achievement in grades
g and g−1 (i.e., Dtg = 0). With these restrictions, VAM1 can be seen as the ﬁrst-difference
estimator for a ﬁxed effects model, with strict exogeneity of classroom assignments conditional
on mi. By contrast, (4) is not likely to hold if c(i, g) depends, even in part, on wig−1, vig−1, or
Aig−1.
3.4 The lagged score model (VAM2)
VAM2 augments VAM1 with a control for the lagged test score. If teacher effects decay geo-










and the grade-g gain is thus
DAig = ˇ ag+Aig−1y +bggc(i,g)+e2ig (7)
9Rothstein (2008b) concludes that Dvig accounts for as much as 80% of the variance of DAig.


















As before, each of the terms in (8) is likely to be serially correlated. The VAM2 exclusion
restriction, E
￿
e2ig|c(i, g) = c
￿
=0, would hold if grade-g classroom assignments were random
conditional on Aig−1. It is unlikely to hold if assignments depend directly on e2ig−1 or on any
of its components. In particular, c(i, g) cannot depend on mi except through Aig−1.10
The VAM2 exclusionrestriction can again be evaluated by replacing the dependent variable,
DAig, with its lag, DAig−1. By (6), the lagged score equals
Aig−1 = ˇ aig−1+Aig−2l +bg−1,g−1,c(i,g−1)+e2ig−1. (9)








Thus, the grade-g classroom assignment will have predictive power for the gain score in grade
g−1, controlling for g−1 achievement, if grade-g classrooms are correlated either with grade-
g−1 teacher effects (i.e. with bg−1,g−1,c(i,g−1)) or with e2ig−1. As in VAM1, the former can be
ruled out by controlling for g−1 classroom assignments; the latter would indicate a violation
of the VAM2 exclusion restriction if e2 is serially correlated.
10If tg−tg−1l is constant across g, (6) can be seen as a ﬁxed effects model with a lagged dependent variable.
IV and GMM estimates of the ﬁrst-difference of (6), treating DAig−1 as an endogenous variable, can identify l
and bgg if c(i, g) depends on mi but is strictly exogenous conditional on this (Anderson and Hsiao, 1981; Arellano
and Bond, 1991). Koedel and Betts (2007) is the only teacher value added study of which I am aware that takes
account of the issues raised by lagged dependent variables. Value added researchers typically apply OLS to (7).
This is inconsistent for y, and identiﬁes bggc only if c(i, g) is random conditional on Aig−1.
113.5 The ﬁxed effects in gains model (VAM3)
The ﬁnal VAM returns to the earlier assumption of zero decay of teachers’ effects.11 It incor-
porates the ability term in (2) into the estimating equation,
DAig = Dag+bggc(i,g)+miDtg+e3ig, (11)
leaving only two components in the error term, e3ig = Dwig+Dvig.
The presence of the student ﬁxed effect in VAM3, combined with the small time dimension
of student data sets, means that VAM3 requires stronger assumptions than the earlier models.
Assuming that Dtg = 1 for each g, (11) is a ﬁxed effects model. An OLS regression with ﬁxed
effects is numerically equivalent to a regression of the de-meaned outcome on the de-meaned







































The equation for the de-meaned gain score thus has a grade-speciﬁc intercept and coefﬁcients
for all classroom assignments in grades 1 through G. Importantly, the error terms from all
grades enter into (12). Thus, correlation between the classroom assignment in one grade and
the error term in that or any other grade would bias the estimated b coefﬁcients, even in large
samples. To avoid bias, teacher assignments must be strictly exogenous conditional on mi. 12
Conditional strict exogeneity means that the same information, mi or some function of it, is
used to make teacher assignments in each grade. This requires, in effect, that principals decide
11While VAM1 and VAM2 can easily be generalized to allow for non-uniform decay, VAM3 cannot.
12As G gets large, 1
G shrinks toward zero, and e3ih disappears from the equation for the de-meanedgrade-g gain,
g 6= h. For practical value added implementations, however, G is rarely larger than three or four. Without strict
exogeneity, one small-G approach is to focus on the ﬁrst difference of (11). When G > 2, OLS estimation of the
ﬁrst-differenced equation requires only that c(i,g) be uncorrelated with e3ig−1, e3ig, and e3ig+1. Though this is
weaker than strict exogeneity, it is difﬁcult to imagine an assignment process that would satisfy one but not the
other. Another option is IV/GMM (see note 10), instrumenting for both the g and g−1 classroom assignments.
Satisfactory instruments are not apparent.
12on classroom assignments for the remainder of a child’s career before she starts kindergarten. If
teacher assignments are updated each year in response to the student’s performance during the
previous year, strict exogeneity is violated.
The extension of my test to the strict exogeneity assumption in VAM3 is a direct application
ofChamberlain’s(1984)correlatedrandomeffectsmodel. Understrictexogeneity,anyapparent
effect of (for example) 5th grade teachers on 4th grade gains in VAM1 appears only because
both 5th grade teacher assignments and 4th grade gains depend on m. 3rd grade gains also
depend on the scalar mi. So 5th grade teachers who appear to have positive effects on 4th grade
gains – because they are assigned high-m students – should also appear to have positive effects
on 3rd grade gains. An indication that a 5th grade teacher has different effects on 3rd and 4th
grade gains would thus imply that omitted time-varying determinants of gains are correlated
with teacher assignments, and therefore that assignments are not strictly exogenous.
Formally, consider a projection of m onto the full sequence of classroom assignments:
mi = x1c(i,1)+...+xGc(i,G)+hi. (13)
xhc is the incremental information about mi provided by the knowledge that the student was in
classroom c in grade h, conditional on classroom assignments in all other grades. Substituting






where pggc = xgcDtg+bggc and phgc = xhcDtg for h 6= g. Under conditional strict exogeneity,
E[e3ih|c(i,1), ..., c(i,G)] = 0 for each h, and the fact that (13) is a linear projection ensures
that hi is uncorrelated with the regressors as well. An OLS regression of grade-g gains onto
classroom indicators in grades 1 through G thus estimates the phgc coefﬁcients without bias.
13When G ≥ 3, the underlying parameters are overidentiﬁed. To see this, note that







Dt1 andDt2 are scalars, so (15)represents J3−1 overidentifyingrestrictionson the2J3 elements
of the p31 and p32 vectors.13
Equation (15) implies that the elements of p31 should be perfectly correlated with the corre-
sponding elements of p32 (or, if Dt1/Dt2 < 0, perfectly negatively correlated), so the correlation
between elements of the estimated coefﬁcient vectors ˆ p31 and ˆ p32 should be close to 1 (or -1).






















































is distributed c2 with J3−1 degrees of freedom under the null hypothesis of strict exogeneity.14
If D is above the 95% critical value from this distribution, the null is rejected. In practice,
implementations of VAM3 treat mi as a ﬁxed effect, thus imposing the additional restriction that
Dt2 = Dt1. Under the null that this model is correct, the restricted D has J3 degrees of freedom.
3.6 Implementation and Computation
To put the three VAMs in the best possible light, I focus on estimation of within-school differ-
ences in classroom effects. For many purposes, one might want to make across-school com-
parisons. But students are not randomly assigned to schools, and those at one school may gain
13There are J1 additional overidentifying restrictions created by a similar proportionality relationship between
p12 and p13: Past teachers should have similar effects on all future grades’ gains. These restrictions might fail
either because strict exogeneity is violated or because teachers’ effects decay (that is, b12 6= b13). I therefore focus
on restrictions on the future teacher coefﬁcients, as these provide sharper tests of strict exogeneity.
14Although there are J3−2 parameters to be estimated, they are underidentiﬁed: Multiplying x3 by a constant
and dividingDt1 and Dt2 by the same constant does not changethe ﬁt. In the implementation,I normalizeDt1 =1.
14systematically faster than those at another for reasons unrelated to teacher quality. Random as-
signment to classrooms within schools is at least somewhat plausible. To isolate within-school
variation, I augment each of the estimating equations discussed above with a set of indicators
for the school attended. The indicators for all of the classrooms at a school are collinear with
the indicator for the school, and I normalize the classroom coefﬁcients to have mean zero across
classrooms in the same grade at the same school.15
The tables below report summary statistics for the teacher coefﬁcients rather than the full
coefﬁcient vectors themselves. Due to sampling error, summary statistics computed from the
estimatedcoefﬁcients differfrom thosethatwould beobtainedwere thetruecoefﬁcients known.
Aaronson et al. (2007) propose a simpleestimator for the variance of the true coefﬁcients across
teachers. Let g be a mean-zero J-vector of true projection coefﬁcients – those that would be
obtained with an inﬁnitely large sample – and let ˆ g be an unbiased ﬁnite-sample estimate of
g, with E[g0(ˆ g −g)] = 0. The variance (across elements) of g can be written as the difference















I compute E[ˆ g0ˆ g] using a degrees-of-freedom adjustment for the school-level normalization of





is merely the average sampling variance of the
normalized coefﬁcients. All calculations are weighted by the number of students taught.
Some of the speciﬁcations discussed above – particularly (14) – include indicators for class-
room assignments in several grades simultaneously. This introduces several complications. I
discuss them brieﬂy here, then in moredetail in the Appendix. First, school indicators in several
grades are identiﬁed only from students who switch schools between grades. School switching
is likely to be endogenous to a variety of unobserved student characteristics. In speciﬁcations
containing classroom assignments from multiple grades, I restrict my sample to students who
15ThisnormalizationmakesW singularin(16). FortheOMDanalysis,Idroptheelementsofpgh thatcorrespond
to the largest class at each school.
15do not switch schools, and include only a single set of school indicators.
Second, speciﬁcations with several sets of classroom indicators have design matrices of
large dimension. Numerical inverses may be unstable. My focus on samples of non-movers
eliminates this problem when the speciﬁcation includes only school and teacher indicators, as
it ensures that indicators for teachers at different schools are uncorrelated and that the design
matrix is block diagonal. I treat these speciﬁcations as separate regressions for each school,
each with only a few dozen regressors. Speciﬁcations that include continuous covariates (e.g.,
VAM2) cannot be decomposed in this way. For these, I begin with brute-force estimates, then
verify the estimated coefﬁcients using an iterative algorithm (described in the Appendix) that
does not require inversion of large matrices.
A ﬁnal complication is that the coefﬁcients for teachers in different grades can only be sep-
arately identiﬁed when there is sufﬁcient shufﬂing of students between classrooms. If students
are perfectly streamed – if a student’s classmates in 4th grade were also her classmates in 3rd
grade – the 3rd and 4th grade classroom indicators are collinear. I exclude from my samples a
few schools where inadequate shufﬂing leads to perfect collinearity.
4 Data and Sample Construction
The speciﬁcations described in Section 3 require longitudinaldata that track students’outcomes
across several grades, linked to classroom assignments in each grade. I use administrative data
on public school students in North Carolina. The data, assembled and distributed by the North
Carolina Education Research Data Center, have been extensively cleaned to ensure accurate
matches between the component administrative data systems, and have been used for several
previous value added analyses (see, e.g., Clotfelter et al., 2006; Goldhaber, 2007).
I examineend-of-grade math and reading testsfrom grades 3 through 5. To construct the3rd
grade gain, I use “pre-tests” given at the beginning of 3rd grade in place of 2nd grade scores,
which were not given. I standardize the scale scores separately for each subject-grade-year
16combination.16
The North Carolina data identify the school staff member who administered the end-of-
grade tests. In the elementary grades, this was usually the regular teacher. Following Clotfelter
et al. (2006), I count a student-teacher match as valid if the test administrator taught a “self-
contained” (i.e. all day, all subject) class for the relevant grade in the relevant year, if that class
was not designated as special education or honors, and if at least half of the tests that the teacher
administered were to students in the correct grade. Using this deﬁnition, 73% of 5th graders
can be matched to teachers. In each of my analyses, I restrict the sample to students with valid
teacher matches in all grades for which teacher assignments are controlled.
I focus on the cohort of students who were in 5th grade in 2000-2001. Beginning with
the population (N=99,071), I exclude students who have inconsistent longitudinal records (e.g.
gender changes between years); who were not in 4th grade in 1999-2000; who are missing
4th or 5th grade test scores; or who cannot be matched to a 5th grade teacher. I additionally
exclude5thgradeclassroomsthatcontainfewerthan12samplestudentsoraretheonlyincluded
classroom at the school. This leaves my base sample, consisting of 60,740 students from 3,040
5th grade classrooms and 868 schools.
My analyses all use subsets of this sample that provide sufﬁcient longitudinal data. In
analyses of 4th grade gains, for example, I exclude students who have missing 3rd grade scores
or who were not in 3rd grade in 1998-1999. In speciﬁcations that include identiﬁers for teachers
in multiple grades, I further exclude students who changed schools between grades, plus a few
schools where streaming produces perfect collinearity.
Table 1 presents summary statistics. I showstatistics for the population, for the base sample,
and for my most restricted sample (used for estimation of equation (14)). The last is much
smaller than the others, largely because I require students to have attended the same school in
grades 3 through 5 and to have valid teacher matches in each grade. Table 1 indicates that the
16The test scale is meant to ensure that one point corresponds to an equal amount of learning at each grade and
at each point in the within-grade distribution. Rothstein (2008b) and Ballou (2008) emphasize the importance of
this property for value added modeling. All of the results here are robust to using the original scale.
17base and restricted samples have higher mean 5th grade scores than the full population. This
primarily reﬂects the lower scores of students who switch schools frequently.17 Average 5th
grade gains are similar across samples. The Appendix describes each sample in more detail.
As discussed above, my tests can be applied only if there is sufﬁcient re-shufﬂing of class-
rooms between grades. An Appendix table shows the fraction of students’ 5th grade class-
mates who were also in the same 4th grade classes, by the number of 4th grade classes at the
school. Complete reshufﬂing (combined with equally-sized classes) would produce 0.5 with
two classes, 0.33 with three, and so on. The actual fractions are larger than this, but only
slightly. In schools with exactly three 5th grade teachers, for example, 35% of students’ 5th
grade classmates were also their classmates in 4th grade. In only 7% of multiple-classroom
schools do the 4th and 5th grade classroom indicators have less than full rank (after dropping
one teacher per grade).
Table 2 presents the correlation of test scores and gains across grades and subjects. The
table indicates that 5th grade scores are correlated above 0.8 with 4th grade scores in the same
subject, while correlations with scores in earlier grades or other subjects are somewhat lower.
5th grade gains are strongly negatively correlated with 4th grade levels and gains in the same
subject and weakly negatively with those in the other subject. The correlations between 5th and
3rd grade gains are small but signiﬁcant both within and across subjects.
VAM3 is predicated on the notion that student ability is an important component of annual
gains. Assuming that high-ability students gain faster (i.e. that tg+1 > tg for each g), this
would imply positive correlations between gains in different years. There is no indication of
this in Table 2. One potential explanation is that noise in the annual tests introduces negative
autocorrelation in gains, but Rothstein (2008a,b) concludes that noise cannot account for the
magnitude of the observed negative year-to-year correlation. This strongly suggests that VAM3
is poorly suited to the test score data generating process.
17Table 1 shows that average 3rd and 4th grade scores in the “population” are well above zero. The norming
sample that I use to standardize scores in each grade consists of all students in that grade in the relevant year (i.e.
of all 3rd graders in 1999), while only those who make normal progress to 5th grade in 2001 are included in the
sample for Columns 1-2. The low scores of students who repeat grades account for the discrepancy.
185 Results
Tables 3, 4, and 5 present results for the three VAMs in turn. I begin with VAM1, in Table
3. I regress 5th grade math and reading gains (in Columns 1 and 2, respectively) on indicators
for 5th grade classrooms, then normalize the resulting coefﬁcients to have mean zero within
each school. In each case, the hypothesis that all of the teacher coefﬁcients are zero (i.e. that
classroom indicators have no explanatory power beyond that provided by school indicators) is
decisively rejected. The VAM indicates that the within-school standard deviations of 5th grade
teachers’ effects on math and reading are 0.15 and 0.11, respectively. This is similar to what
has been found in other studies (e.g., Aaronson et al., 2007; Rivkin et al., 2005).
Columns 3 and 4 present falsiﬁcation tests in which 4th grade gains are substituted for
the 5th grade gains as dependent variables, with the speciﬁcation otherwise unchanged. The
standard deviation of 5th grade teachers’ “effects” on 4th grade gains is 0.08 in each subject,
and the hypothesis of zero association is rejected in each speciﬁcation. In both the standard
deviation and statistical signiﬁcance senses, 5th grade classroom assignments are slightly more
strongly associated with 4th grade reading gains than with math gains.
One potential explanation for these counterfactual effects is that they represent omitted vari-
ables bias deriving from my failure to control for 4th grade teachers. Columns 5-8 present es-
timates that do control for 4th grade classroom assignments, using a sample of students who
attended the same school in 4th and 5th grades and can be matched to teachers in each grade.
Two aspects of the results are of interest. First, 4th grade teachers have strong independent
predictive power for 5th grade gains. This is at least suggestive that the “zero decay” assump-
tion is violated. I return to this in Section 7. Second, the coefﬁcients on 5th grade classroom
indicators in models for 4th grade gains remain quite variable – even more so than in the sparse
speciﬁcations in Columns 3 and 4 – and are signiﬁcantly different from zero. Evidently, the
correlation between 5th grade teachers and 4th grade gains derives from sorting on the basis of
the 4th grade residual, not merely from between-grade correlation of teacher assignments.
These results strongly suggest that the exclusion restrictions for VAM1 are violated. To
19demonstrate this conclusively, however, we need to show that the residual in VAM1, e1ig, is
serially correlated. To examine this, I re-estimated VAM1 for 4th grade teachers’ effects on 4th
grade gains. The correlation between ˆ e1i4 and ˆ e1i5 is -0.38 in math and -0.37 in reading.
The negative serial correlation of e1 implies that students with high gains in 4th grade will
tend to have low gains in 5th grade, and vice versa. Because VAM1 evidently does not ade-
quately control for classroom assignments, it gives unearned credit to teachers who are assigned
students who did poorly in 4th grade, as these students will predictably post unusually high 5th
grade gains when they revert toward their long-run means. Similarly, teachers whose students
did unusually well in 4th grade will be penalized by the students’ fall back toward their long-
run means in 5th grade. Indeed, an examination of the VAM1 coefﬁcients indicates that 5th
grade teachers whose students have above-average 4th grade gains have systematically lower
estimated value added than teachers whose students underperformed in the prior year. Impor-
tantly, this pattern is stronger than can be explained by sampling error in the estimated teacher
effects; it reﬂect true mean reversion and not merely measurement error.
Table 4 repeats the falsiﬁcation exercise for VAM2. The structure is identical to that of
Table 3. Columns 1 and 2 present estimates of the basic VAM for 5th grade teachers’ effects on
5th grade gains, controlling for 4th grade math and reading scores. The standard deviations of
5th grade teachers’ effects are nearly identical to those in Table 3. Columns 3 and 4 substitute
4th grade gains as the dependent variable. Once again, we see that 5th grade teachers are
strongly predictive, more so in reading than in math. Columns 5-8 augment the speciﬁcation
with controls for 4th grade teachers. The 5th grade teacher coefﬁcients are no longer jointly
signiﬁcantinthe4thgrademathgainspeciﬁcation, thoughtheyremain quitelargeinmagnitude.
They are still highly signiﬁcant in the speciﬁcation for 4th grade reading gains.
The VAM2 residuals, like the VAM1 residuals, are strongly correlated between 4th and
5th grades, -0.21 in math and -0.19 in reading. They are also correlated across subjects: -
0.14 between 4th grade reading and 5th grade math. Thus, the evidence that 5th grade teacher
assignments are correlated with earlier reading gains even after controlling for 4th grade scores
20in both subjects indicates that the VAM2 exclusion restriction is violated, regardless of whether
the dependent variable is the math or the reading gain. As before, 5th grade teachers’ effects on
5th grade gains are negatively correlated with their counterfactual “effects” on 4th grade gains,
suggesting that mean reversion in student achievement – combined with non-random classroom
assignments – is an important source of bias in VAM2.
As discussed in Section 3.5, the falsiﬁcation test for VAM3 takes a different form. I begin
by selecting the subsamplewith non-missing 3rd and 4th grade gains; valid teacher assignments
in grades 3, 4, and 5; and continuous enrollment at the same school in all three grades. I exclude
26 schools where the three sets of indicators for teachers in grades 3, 4, and 5 (dropping one
teacher in each grade from each school) are collinear. I then regress both the 3rd and 4th grade
gains on school indicators and on each of the three sets of teacher indicators.18
Table 5 reports estimates for math gains, in Columns 1 and 2, and for reading gains, in
Columns 4 and 5. The ﬁrst panel shows the standard deviations (adjusted for sampling error)
of the coefﬁcients for each grade’s teachers. Gains in each subject and in each grade are sub-
stantially correlated with classroom assignments in all three grades. Although p-values are not
shown, in all 12 cases the hypothesis of zero effects is rejected. Columns 3 and 6 report the
across-teacher correlations between the coefﬁcients in the models for 3rd and 4th grade gains
(i.e., between pg3 and pg4). The most important correlation is that for 5th grade teachers, -0.04
for math and -0.06 for reading. Recall that strict exogeneity implies that the 5th grade teacher
coefﬁcients in the model for 4th grade gains should be proportional to the corresponding co-
efﬁcients in the model for 3rd grade gains, p54 = (Dt4/Dt3)p53, implying a correlation of ±1.
The near-zero correlations strongly suggest that a single ability factor is unable to account for
the apparent “effects” of 5th grade teachers on gains in earlier grades. Indeed, they are direct
evidence against the VAM3 identifying assumption of conditional strict exogeneity.
18It is not essential to the correlated random effects test that the full sequence of teacher assignments back to
grade 1 be observed, but the test may over-reject if classroom assignments in grades 3-5 are correlated with those
in 1st and 2nd grade and if the latter have continuing effects on 3rd and 4th grade gains. Recall, however, that
VAM3 assumes such lagged effects away.
21The lower panel of Table 5 presents OMD estimates of the restricted model.19 I consider
two versions, one that constrains Dt4/Dt3 = 1 (as would be needed in order to estimate VAM3
using conventional ﬁxed effects methods) and another that does not. Neither model is able to
ﬁt the data. For math scores, the estimated ratio Dt4/Dt3 from the less restrictive model is 0.14,
implying that student ability is much more important to 3rd grade than to 4th grade gains. Thus,
the constrained estimates imply negligible coefﬁcients for 5th grade teachers in the equation
for 4th grade gains, and do a very poor job of ﬁtting the unconstrained estimate of the standard
deviation of these coefﬁcients, 0.099. The test statistic D is 2,136, and the overidentifying
restrictions are overwhelminglyrejected. In the reading speciﬁcation, the Dt4/Dt3 ratio is closeto
one, andtherestrictedmodelallowsformeaningfulcoefﬁcientson5thgradeteachers inboththe
3rd and 4th grade gain equations, albeit much less variability than is seen in the unconstrained
model. But the test statistic is even larger here, and the restricted model is again rejected. We
can thus conclude that 5th grade teacher assignments are not strictly exogenous with respect to
either math or reading gains, even conditional on single-dimensional (subject-speciﬁc) student
heterogeneity. The identifying assumption for VAM3 is thus violated.
The results in Tables 3, 4, and 5 indicate that all three of the VAMs considered here rely
on incorrect exclusion restrictions – teacher assignments evidently depend on the past learning
trajectory even after controlling for student ability or the prior year’s test score. It is possible,
however,thatslightmodiﬁcationsoftheVAMscouldeliminatetheendogeneity. Ihaveexplored
several alternative speciﬁcations to gauge the robustness of the results. I have re-estimated
VAM1 and VAM2 with controls for student race, gender, and free lunch status; this has no
effect on the tests. Similarly, I have explored a variety of alternative test scalings. The three
VAMs continue to fail falsiﬁcation tests when I use the original score scales or percentiles in
place of the standardized-by-grade scores used in Tables 3, 4, and 5.
The results are also not speciﬁc to the cohort examined here; I obtain similar results using
data from other cohorts. As a ﬁnal investigation, I have extended the tests to evaluate VAM
19The OMD analysis uses a variance-covariance matrix W that is robust to arbitrary heteroskedasiticity and
within-student, between-grade clustering.
22analyses that use data from multiple cohorts of students to distinguish between permanent and
transitory components of a teacher’s “effect.” As discussed in the Appendix, the implicit as-
sumptions under which this can avoid the biases identiﬁed here do not appear to hold in the
data.
6 How Much Does This Matter?
Theresults in Section 5 indicatethat the identifyingassumptionsfor all three VAMsare violated
in the North Carolina data. However, if classroom assignments nearly satisfy the assumptions
underlying the VAMs, the models might yield almost unbiased estimates of teachers’ causal
effects. In this Section, I use the degree of sorting on prior outcomes to quantify the magnitude
of the biases resulting from non-random assignments. I focus on VAM1 and VAM2, as the lack
of correlation between 3rd and 5th grade gains (Table 2) strongly suggests that the additional
complexity and strong maintained assumptions of VAM3 are unnecessary.
In general, classroom assignments may depend both on variables that are observable by
the econometrician and on unobserved factors. The former can in principle be incorporated
into VAM speciﬁcations. Accordingly, the ﬁrst part of my investigation focuses on the role
of observable characteristics that are omitted from VAM1 and VAM2. I compare VAM1 and
VAM2 to a saturated speciﬁcation that controls for teacher assignments in grades 3 and 4, end-
of-grade scores in both subjects in both grades, and scores from the tests given at the beginning
of 3rd grade. This speciﬁcation would identify 5th grade teachers’ effects if assignments were
random conditional on the test score and teacher assignment history. It is thus more general
than VAM2. It does not strictly nest VAM1, however: Assignment of teachers based purely on
student ability (mi) would satisfy the VAM1 exclusion restriction, but not that for the saturated
model. Of course, if assignments depend on both ability and lagged scores, VAM1, VAM2, and
the saturated VAM are all misspeciﬁed.
Table 6 presents comparisons of the saturated VAM with VAM1 and VAM2. The ﬁrst rows
23show the estimated standard deviations of teachers’ effects obtained from VAM1 and VAM2, as
applied to thesubsetofstudentswith completetest score historiesand validteacher assignments
in each prior grade. The unadjusted estimates are somewhat higher than those in Tables 3 and
4, as the smaller sample yields noisier estimates. The sampling-adjusted estimates are quite
similar to those from the larger sample. The next two rows of the Table show estimates from






55 ). I again show both the raw standard deviation of
the point estimates and an adjusted standard deviation that removes the portion due to sampling
error. For VAM1, the bias has a standard deviation overa third as large as the standard deviation
of the estimated effects. For VAM2, which already includes a subset of the controls in the
saturated model, the bias is somewhat smaller. For both VAMs, the bias is more important in
estimates of teachers’ value added for math scores than for reading scores.
Of course, the exercise carried out here can only diagnose bias in VAM1 and VAM2 from
selection on observables – variables that can easily be included in the VAM speciﬁcation. In
a companion paper (Rothstein, 2008a), I attempt to quantify the bias that is likely to result
from selection on unobservables. Classroom assignments likely also depend on characteristics
– behavior, personality, parental intervention, etc. – that may be observed by the principal
but are unobserved by the econometrician. These characteristics may be predictive of future
outcomes. Following the intuition (Altonji et al., 2005) that the weight of observable (to the
econometrician) and unobservable variables in classroom assignments is likely to mirror their
relative weights in predicting achievement, one can use the degree of sorting on observables to
estimate the importance of unobservables and therefore the magnitude of the bias in estimated
teacher effects. Under varying assumptions about the amount of information that parents and
principals have, I ﬁnd that the bias from non-random assignments is plausibly 50-75% as large
(in standard deviation terms) as the estimates of teachers’ effects in VAM1, and perhaps half
24this large in VAM2.20 These estimates imply that VAM2 and especially VAM1 seriously mis-
identify teachers’ true causal effects, crediting teachers for the students they are assigned. One
cannot be conﬁdent that a teacher identiﬁed as good by these models is in fact a good teacher,
rather than simply a teacher who was given students predicted (by principals, if not by the
econometrician) to gain quickly.
7 Short-Run vs. Long-Run Effects
Although classroom assignments are the focus of this paper, it is worth returning to another
implication of the results in Section 5. Recall from Columns 5-6 of Tables 3 and 4 that 4th
grade teachers appear to have large effects on students’ 5th grade gains. Given the results for
4th grade gains, these “effects” cannot be treated as causal. But setting this issue aside, we can
use the lagged teacher coefﬁcients to evaluate restrictions on time pattern of teachers’ effects
(that is, on the relationship between bgg and bg,g+s in the production function (1)) that are
universally imposed in value added analyses.
When only a single grade’s teacher assignment is included, VAM2 implicitly assumes that
teachers’ effects decay at a uniform, geometric rate (bg,g+s =bggls for l ∈[0, 1]), whileVAM1
assumeszero decay (l =0). It is not clear that eitherrestrictionis reasonable. One can certainly
imagine that some teaching styles (e.g., “teaching to the test”) would produce large short-run
effects that decay quickly while other styles (emphasizing independent exploration)might yield
smaller short-run effects that persist and even grow in later years.21 As this example shows, it
is far from clear that accountability policy should focus exclusively on short-run effects rather
than long-run effects if the two in fact differ.
While several studies have attempted to estimate the decay parameter y,22 this is the ﬁrst
20Kane and Staiger’s (2008) comparison of experimental and non-experimentalvalue added estimates would be
unlikely to detect biases of this magnitude.
21Although a full discussion is beyond the scope of this paper, assumptions about “decay” are closely related to
issues of test scaling and content coverage (Rothstein, 2008b; Ballou, 2008; Martineau, 2006).
22Studies predating this one include Andrabi et al. (2008), Sanders and Rivers (1996), and Konstantopoulos
(2007).
25value added study of which I am aware that estimates teachers’ immediate and lagged effects
without imposing a restriction of uniform decay. As a ﬁnal investigation, I analyze the validity
of this restriction by comparing a grade-g teacher’s initial effect in grade g with her longer-run
effect on scores in grade g+1 or g+2.23 Under the uniform decay restriction, these should be
perfectly correlated (except for sampling error).
I begin by estimating VAM1 and VAM2 for 3rd, 4th, and 5th grade gains, augmenting each
speciﬁcation with controls for past teachers back to 3rd grade. I then compute 3rd and 4th
grade teachers’ cumulative effects over one, two, and (for 3rd grade teachers) three years. Table
7 presents summary statistics for these cumulative effects. I show their standard deviation and
theircorrelationwiththeinitialeffects bggc, bothadjustedforsamplingerror. Twoaspects ofthe
results are of note. First, the standard deviation of teachers’ estimated “effects” falls in the year
after contact – there is much more variation in 4th grade teachers’ effects on 4th grade scores
than in those same teachers’ effects on 5th grade scores. With uniform decay at rate (1−l),
var(bg,g+s)=lsvar(bgg), so this is consistentwith the mountingevidence that teachers’ effects
decay importantly in the year after contact (Andrabi et al., 2008; Kane and Staiger, 2008; Jacob
et al., 2008). Second, the correlation between teachers’ ﬁrst year effects and their two year
cumulative effects is much less than one, ranging between 0.33 and 0.51 depending on the
model and subject. Correlations with three-year cumulative effects are (mostly) lower, centered
around 0.4. This is not even approximately consistent with uniform decay. Even if we assume
that the VAM-based estimates can be treated as causal, a teacher’s ﬁrst year effect is a poor
proxy for her longer-run impact.
As a ﬁnal exercise, I bring together theanalyses of endogeneity bias and decay to investigate
whether estimates of short-run effects from VAM1 and VAM2 are reasonably accurate proxies
from those that would be obtained from a superior model for longer-run effects. I estimate
23For VAM1, the effect of being in classroom c in grade g on achievement in grade g+s is simply å
s
t=0bg,g+t,c.
In VAM2, the presence of a lagged dependent variable complicates the calculation of cumulative effects. If
only the same-subject score is controlled, the effect of 3rd grade teacher c on 5th grade achievement is
(b33c(1+y4)+b34c)(1+y5)+b35c. A similar but more complex expression characterizes the effects when
lagged scores in both math and reading are controlled, as in my estimates.
26the saturated VAM from Section 6 for both 4th and 5th grade gains, controlling for all past
observables, and compute the implied cumulative effect of 4th grade teachers on students’ 5th
grade outcomes. Figure 1 shows the scatterplot of VAM1 and VAM2 estimates of 4th grade
teacher effects against those from the cumulative saturated speciﬁcation. Both VAM1- and
VAM2-based estimates of effects on math scores correlate just over 0.4 with those from the
richer model, while correlations for reading achievement are below 0.35.
Many teacher accountability policies focus only on the very best and very worst teachers.
Figure 1 shows the 20th and 80th percentiles of the distribution of estimated effects from each
model. For each contrast, I compute the fraction of teachers in the top and bottom quintile
according to the cumulative, saturated speciﬁcation who are assigned to the same quintile by
VAM1 or VAM2. These are similar to the correlations, around 0.43 for math and 0.35 for
reading. Even ignoring the impact of sampling error, which would tend to exacerbate these
results but is not accounted for here, it is clear that model misspeciﬁcation produces extreme
amounts of misclassiﬁcation. Policies that use VAM1 or VAM2 to attempt to identify the best
and worst teachers will both reward and punish teachers who do not deserve it and fail to reward
and punish teachers who do.
8 Discussion
Access to panel data allows the econometrician to control for individual heterogeneity much
more ﬂexibly than can be accomplished in cross-sectional data, but even panel data models
can identify treatment effects only if assignment to treatment satisﬁes strong ignorability as-
sumptions. This has long been recognized in the literature on program evaluation, but has
received relatively little attention in the literature on the estimation of teachers’ effects on stu-
dent achievement. In this paper, I have shown how the availability of lagged outcome measures
can be used to evaluate common value added speciﬁcations.
The results presented here show that the assumptions underlying common VAMs are sub-
27stantiallyincorrect, at least in North Carolina. Classroom assignmentsare not exogenouscondi-
tional on thetypical controls, and estimates of teachers’ effects based on these modelscannot be
interpreted as causal. Clear evidence of this is that each VAM indicates that 5th grade teachers
have quantitatively important “effects” on students’ 4th grade learning.
This result casts serious doubt on the value of simpleVAMs for accountability and incentive
policies, which will clearly be sensitive to the assignment of students to teachers. Teachers
operating under high-stakes VAM-based accountability and incentive systems can be expected
tolobbytheirprincipalstobeassignedthe“right”studentswhowillpredictablyyieldhighvalue
added scores, and principalswill presumablyalter theirassignment rules to direct thesestudents
toward favored teachers. As teacher-student matching is a potentially important determinant of
student learning (Clotfelter et al., 2006; Dee, 2005), distortion of these matches due to efforts
to manipulate teachers’ value added scores can have real efﬁciency consequences.
It isclearthat richerVAMsareneeded. Thesewillneed toaccommodatedynamicclassroom
assignments and will probably require behavioral assumptions about the principal’s objective
function and information set. For example, one might assume that classroom assignments de-
pend on the principal’s best prediction of students’ unobserved ability, and that this prediction
is after receipt with each year’s test results. None of the VAMs considered here can accom-
modate assignments of this form, which on its face seems more plausible than the identifying
assumptions for VAM1, VAM2, or VAM3.
Attempts to infer causal effects even from rich, dynamic VAMs call for a great deal of
caution and attention to the required assumptions. Any VAM proposed for policy use should be
subjected both to thorough validation and to falsiﬁcation exercises. The tests implemented here
suggest a starting point, and may be adaptable to richer models. Failure to reject the exclusion
restrictions need not indicate that the restrictions are correct, as my tests can identify only
sorting based on past observables. But rejection does indicate that the VAM-based estimates
are likely to be misleading about teachers’ causal effects.
Even with a valid model, it will also be important to measure teachers’ effects on student
28achievement over several years, not merely at the end of the year of exposure. Estimates of
teacher quality are evidently quite sensitive to this aspect of the model. By contrast, there is
little apparent need to allow for permanent heterogeneity in students’ rates of growth, as the
data provide no indication of such heterogeneity.
The questions investigated and methods used here have applications beyond the estimation
of individual teacher quality. The Appendix shows that conclusions about the relationship be-
tween teachers’ observed characteristics and their value added also rest on unsteady ground.
Estimates of the quality of schools and of the effects of ﬁrms on workers’ wages use identical
econometric models, and rely on similar exclusion restrictions. Evidence about the “effects” of
future schools and employers on current outcomes would be informative about the validity of
both sets of estimates.
29A Data Appendix
This appendix describes the construction of the samples used in the paper. I begin with
records on all studentswho were enrolled in 5th grade in North Carolina publicschoolsin 2000-
2001. From this universe, I exclude students with inconsistent longitudinal records (i.e. “male”
in some years and “female” in others, amounting to less than 1% of the population); those who
cannot be matched to 4th grade records from 1999-2000, perhaps because they skipped a grade
or attended private school (10%); those who cannot be matched to a 5th grade teacher or for
whom the 5th grade test administrator is not a valid teacher as deﬁned in the text (24%); those
whose 5th grade class has fewer than 12 included students (1%); and those whose elementary
school contains only a single included 5th grade class (3%). This leaves me with a sample of
60,740, 61.3% of the initial population. I refer to this sample as the “base” sample.
Each of my analyses uses subsets of this sample that have complete data on test scores
and teacher assignments for enough years to permit the analysis. A student might be excluded
from the analytical subsample for a particular analysis because there is no record in one of
the necessary grades; because there is a record but no test score; because the student changed
schools between grades; because she could not be matched to a valid teacher in each of the
required grades; because she was the only otherwise-usable student from her class in one or
more grades; because there was only one included class at her school in one or more grades; or
because the school did not shufﬂe students adequately between grades, leading to collinearity
between the classroom assignments in one year and those in other years. Appendix Table A1
describes the samples used in Columns 1-4 of Tables 3 and 4 (requiring complete test histories
from grades 3-5 and teacher assignments in grade 5); in Columns 5-8 of those Tables (also
requiring valid teacher assignments in 4th grade); and in Table 5 (also requiring 3rd grade
teacher assignments and scores from the beginning-of-third-grade tests).
Appendix Table A2 reports statistics on shufﬂing of classrooms between 4th and 5th grades.
This uses a somewhat different sample than other tables, consisting of all students with valid
records and valid teacher matches in both grades 4 and 5 who did not switch schools or make
abnormal progress between grades. Using this sample, I count the number of 4th grade classes
at the school, and I compute for each student the fraction of her 5th grade classmates who were
also in her 4th grade class. I average this over the full sample and over subsamples deﬁned by
the number of 4th grade teachers at the school. I also identify schools where dummies for the J4
4th grade teachers and J5 5th grade teachers have rank less than J4+J5−2, indicating perfect
collinearity of at least one teacher assignment with the others, and re-compute the statistic
excluding observations from those schools.
B Technical Appendix
This appendix provides more detail on some of the computations undertaken in the paper.
B.1 School-level normalizations
As discussed in the text, each of my regressions includes ﬁxed effects for the school at-
30tended, and coefﬁcients on teacher indicators are normalized to have mean zero at the school
level. This normalization is easiest to describe if the sample consists of only a single school.
Let T be an N-by-J matrix of indicators for having been taught by each of the J teachers in a
particular grade at that school. Many of my regressions take the form
y = a +Tb +e. (18)
Let S = [1T] be the data matrix formed by augmenting the T matrix with a constant. Because
each student has exactly one teacher, S0S has rank J, so not all of the J+1 coefﬁcients in a and
b can be separately identiﬁed. Suppose, without loss of generality, that the last element of T
is dropped. Let ˆ b be the estimates of the remaining elements of b, and let Vb be the estimated
sampling variance-covariance matrix for ˆ b. Form ˆ b =
￿ˆ b00
￿0









where 0J is a column vector of J zeros.
Let n be a J-vector with elements nj, where nj is the number of students taught by teacher
j. Then the weighted average element of ˆ b, weighting each teacher by the number of students
taught, can be written as ¯ ˆ b = (n01J)
−1n0 ˆ b (where 1J is a J-vector of ones), and the vector





ˆ b ≡ D ˆ b has weighted mean zero across teachers. The sampling
variance matrix for the normalized coefﬁcients ˆ b − ¯ ˆ b is simply DVD0. This has rank J−1.
The extension of this procedure to samples spanning many schools is straightforward. Sup-
pose that the teacher indicators are ordered, so that the ﬁrst J1 come from school 1, the next J2
from school 2, and so on. Let ˆ b be the full vector of estimated coefﬁcients with the coefﬁcient
for the ﬁnal teacher at each school set to zero (i.e the J1, (J1+J2), etc., elements of ˆ b), and
let V be the sampling variance matrix (with rows and columns of zeros corresponding to the
zero elements of ˆ b). Finally, let Dsbe the Js-by-Js demeaning matrix for school s, computed as







D1 0 ··· 0
0 D2 ··· 0
. . .
. . . ... . . .







As before, the demeaned vector of coefﬁcients is D ˆ b and the variance-covariance matrix is
DVD0. This variance-covariance matrix has rank equal to åsJs−S.
B.2 Sampling-adjusted standard deviations
For many of the models considered in the paper, I report the standard deviationacross teach-
ers of the teacher coefﬁcients. Let ˆ qbe a J-vector of coefﬁcients, normalized as described above
withineach of S schools, letV be thevariance-covariancematrix, and let n be a vectorofstudent
counts.







ˆ q0diag{˜ n} ˆ q, (21)
wherediag{˜ n}istheJ-by-J matrixwithdiagonalelement j equalto nj/¯ n(where ¯ n=(101)
−110n)
and zeros off the diagonal. Note that this incorporates a degrees-of-freedom adjustment for the
school-level normalization.
The standard deviation of teachers’ estimated effects is merely the square root of the above
expression. This overstates the standard deviation that would be obtained in an inﬁnitely large
sample. Let q be the plim of ˆ q, under the ﬁxed-J asymptotics described in the text, and let ˆ q =
q +u, where u is sampling error and E[uu0] =V. This suggests that we can write the variance
of the “true” (net of sampling error) effects as var(q)=var
￿ ˆ q
￿
−var(u), where these variances
are computed across the elements of q and weighted by n. The var
￿ ˆ q
￿
term is estimated as
described above. var(u) is estimated as 1
J åj ¯ n−1njvjj, where ¯ n ≡ (101)
−110n, as above, and vjj
is the jth diagonal element ofV.
B.3 Computationofregressionswithteacherindicatorsformultiple grades
when there are no covariates
Several of the speciﬁcations used here include indicators for teachers in several grades si-
multaneously. The correlated random efffects analysis is the most involved, with indicators for
3rd, 4th, and 5th grade teachers in the same regression (equation (14)):
˜ Ai3 = Ti3p33+Ti4p43+Ti5p53+e3i3 (22)
˜ Ai4 = Ti3p34+Ti4p44+Ti5p54+e3i4. (23)
Two computational challenges arise. First, not all of the p coefﬁcients can be separately com-
puted. The particular problem arises because I restrict the sampleto studentswho do not change
schools. The ﬁtted values of the regressions would be unchanged were we to add a constant c
to each element of the pg,h corresponding to a teacher at a particular school j and subtract the
same constant from the similarly-deﬁned elements of pk,h for some k 6=g. As a result, the mean
of pg,h across all teachers in grade g at school j cannot be separately identiﬁed. I augment (22)
and (23) with school indicators, then select one teacher in each grade at each school to exclude
from the regressions.24 I treat the excluded p coefﬁcient as zero, with sampling variance zero.
After estimating the regression, I normalize the coefﬁcients of (22) and (23) to have mean zero
across teachers in each grade at each school, using the procedure described above.
Thesecondissuederivesfromthesheersizeoftheregression. Evenafterexcludingtheover-
identiﬁed coefﬁcients, each of the Tig vectors has over 2,200 elements, and the full regression
(after dropping redundant indicators) has 5,501 regressors. Numerical inversion of a matrix
of this dimension may introduce inaccuracies. My focus on samples of students who do not
24The sample used for these regressions excludes schools where, due to insufﬁcient mixing, the [Ti3 Ti4 Ti5]
submatrix corresponding to teachers at the school has rank less than Js3+Js4+Js5−2.
32switch schools permits a simpler computation. Re-order the independent variables in equations
(22) and (23) as X =
￿
X(1), X(2), ..., X(J)
￿
, where X(j) contains the indicator for school j and
the indicators for all teachers (in all three grades) at school j. Any sample student who ever
appears in school j never appears in any other school, so X0
(j)X(k) = 0 for all j 6=k. This ensures
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Each block has dimension of only a few dozen, so inversion is straightforward. The p co-
efﬁcients (before the within-school normalization) and robust sampling variances are readily
computed from (X0X)
−1. The covariances between the coefﬁcients of equations (22) and (23)












This implicitly clusters on the individual student, and is equivalent to applying system OLS to
the simultaneous equations (22) and (23).
B.4 Computationofregressionswithteacherindicatorsformultiple grades
when there are continuous covariates
In a few cases (e.g. the “saturated” model discussed in Section 6), I include continuous
regressors Z along withtheschooland teacher indicatorsfrom severalgrades. Theseregressions
have the form
y = XP+Zy +e. (27)
Letting W = [X Z] and L = [P0 y0]
0, we have y = WL+e. Because the y coefﬁcients are
common across schools, W0W is no longer block-diagonal, and the school-by-school strategy
described above cannot be used directly here. In these models, I use a brute-force OLS regres-
sion estimator (implemented in Matlab) to compute the regression of the school de-meaned y
on the de-meaned W. This may introduce numerical inaccuracy in the estimated coefﬁcients,
33ˆ L0. To avoid this, I use an iterative algorithm to obtain improved coefﬁcient estimates. At each
iteration t (beginning with t=1), there are two steps:
1. Treat the y parameters as known, using values from the previous iteration, ˆ yt−1. Regress
y−Z ˆ yt−1 on X. The methods used in the previous section can be applied here, as X0X is
block diagonal with blocks corresponding to schools. Label the resulting coefﬁcients ˆ Pt
2. Treating the ˆ Pt coefﬁcients as known, regress y−X ˆ Pt on Z. Z typically contains only a
handful of variables, so this is simple to calculate. Label the resulting coefﬁcients ˆ yt, and
use these as inputs to step 1 on the next iteration.
These steps are repeated until the coefﬁcient vector converges. Convergence is considered to
have been achieved when the maximum change in the regression residuals et ≡ y−X ˆ Pt −Z ˆ yt
from the previous iteration – that is, ket −et−1ksup – is less than 10−6sy.
This is essentially the Gauss-Seidel method, though the structure of the problem makes it
possible to use only two sub-vectors of the full parameter vector L rather than stepping through
each element of L separately as in typical implementations. It can be shown to be a contraction
mapping on the sum of squared errors, so the coefﬁcients necessarily converge to the OLS
coefﬁcients. Abowd et al. (2002) use a similar (in spirit, though not in detail) computational
strategy.
In practice, the initialbrute-force estimates are quiteaccurate, and only one or two iterations
are required before convergence is achieved. As the iterative algorithm does not yield standard
errors, I use a brute-force estimate of (W0W)
−1 to compute these.
C Additional Speciﬁcations
C.1 Teachers’ observable characteristics
VAMs are used not only to estimate individual teachers’ effects, but also to assess the re-
lationship of teacher quality with teachers’ observed characteristics (see, e.g., Clotfelter et al.,
2006, 2007; Goldhaber and Brewer, 1997; Hanushek and Rivkin, 2006). These analyses replace
the teacher indicators in VAM1, VAM2, or VAM3 with vectors of teacher observables – edu-
cation, experience, etc. The tests developed in the main text can be applied to these models as
well. Appendix Table C1 presents results for mathematics. (Results for reading are similar and
are available from the author.) I focus on a short vector of teacher characteristics: An indica-
tor for whether the teacher has a master’s degree, a linear experience measure, an indicator for
whether the teacher has less than two years of experience, and the teacher’s score on the Praxis
tests required to obtain elementary certiﬁcation in North Carolina.25 As in the other analyses,
25Each test is standardized among North Carolina teachers who took it in the same year, then (when multiple
scores are available) scores are averaged across tests.
34I restrict attention to students who can be assigned to valid teachers in each grade for which
teacher characteristics will be controlled and who do not switch schools between grades. I fur-
ther exclude students for whom I am unable to assemble complete characteristics for each of
the relevant teachers.
Column 1 presents estimates from VAM1 of the effects of 4th and 5th grade teachers on 5th
grade gains, controlling for school ﬁxed effects and clustering the standard errors on the school.
The 5th grade teacher coefﬁcients echo those in the literature: A master’s degree appears to
make little difference, but inexperienced teachers have quite negative effects on student gains.
Interestingly, inexperienced 4th grade teachers seem to have large positive effects on 5th grade
gains, perhaps indicating that students quickly make up for time lost during 4th grade. See the
discussion in Section 7.
Column 2 repeats the VAM1 speciﬁcation, this time using the 4th grade gain as the depen-
dent variable. The 4th grade teacher coefﬁcients are consistent with those seen for 5th grade
teachers in Column 1. But Column 2 also indicates that the 5th grade teacher’s Praxis score is
positively associated with the 4th grade gain score, while the coefﬁcient on the dummy for an
inexperienced 5th grade teacher is negative and nearly signiﬁcant (t = −1.85). The hypothesis
that all 5th grade teacher characteristics have zero coefﬁcients is rejected (p = 0.02). This is
clear evidence that the VAM1 exclusion restriction is violated by student sorting.
Columns 3 and 4 present the analysis of VAM2, modeling 5th grade scores in Column 3
and 3rd grade scores in Column 4. Results in Column 3 are similar to those in Column 2. In
Column 4, none of the 5th grade coefﬁcients are individually signiﬁcant, but the test that all
are zero is marginally signiﬁcant (p = 0.11). Given the low power of my tests for analyses
of teacher characteristics, which are only weakly correlated with student achievement in any
grade, I interpret this as only mildly encouraging.
Columns 5 and 6 present the correlated random effects analysis that I use to evaluateVAM3,
modeling 3rd and 4th grade gains, respectively, as functions of the characteristics of teachers
in grades 3 through 5. I again consider two restricted models, one that constrains student abil-
ity to enter identically into each grade’s gain score equation and another that allows different
ability coefﬁcients in different grades. The former model – corresponding to the version of
VAM3 that is uniformly used in the literature – implies that the 5th grade teacher coefﬁcients in
columns 5 and 6 of Table 6 should be equal. Iin fact, we see a signiﬁcant negative coefﬁcient
for the no experience indicator in the model for 4th grade gains and a marginally signiﬁcant
(t = 1.67) positive coefﬁcient in the model for 3rd grade gains. The hypothesis of equal effects
is decisively rejected (p=0.02). The less restrictive model requires only that the coefﬁcients
in columns 5 and 6 be proportional to one another. This restriction is consistent with the data
(p=0.81). However, the OMD estimates indicate a factor of proportionality of -0.92. If we
normalize ˜ t3 = 1, deﬁning “ability” to have a positive effect on 3rd grade gains, the model in-
dicates that high ability students gain much less during 4th grade than their low ability peers.
An alternative interpretation of this extremely counterintuitive result is that the test is unable
to detect violations of strict exogeneity in this context. The correlated random effects test has
power against violations of strict exogeneity only if classroom assignments depend on factors
that are correlated with the included variables. As all of the coefﬁcients except those for the
inexperienced teacher indicator are small and far from statistically signiﬁcant, and as even the
inexperienced teacher coefﬁcients are consistent with the model only with implausible coef-
ﬁcient estimates, the simplest interpretation is that VAM3 is poorly suited to identifying the
35effects of teacher characteristics on student achievement. Indeed, when I extend the analysis
to use the characteristics of 6th grade teachers – students are typically in middle school in 6th
grade, and ability tracking is more pronounced – to strengthen the overidentiﬁcation test (see
Rothstein, 2008b), I reject proportionality of the 6th grade teacher coefﬁcients.
C.2 Distinguishing between teacher and classroom effects using cross-
cohort comparisons
In the main paper, I use the terms “classroom effects” and “teacher effects” interchangeably
to describe the effects of being in a single classroom. Under certain circumstances a distinction
between the two – between a teacher’s effect that is the same every year and a classroom effect
that may vary from year to year as the teacher is assigned new cohorts of students – may make
it possible to obtain unbiased estimates of teachers’ causal effects under weaker conditions than
are considered in the text.
Let btyc be the effect of being in classroom c taught by teacher t in year y. (I suppress grade
subscripts for notational simplicity.) We can decompose this into a permanent component as-
sociated with the teacher and a time-varying component associated with transitory aspects of
the classroom in year y. Let c(t, y) be the classroom taught by teacher t in year y, and assume
that btyc(t,y) = qt +uty. Here, qt is the teacher’s effect, and uty is the additional portion of the
classroom effect. If we assume that the non-random assignments of students to classrooms are
completely transitory – that the pre-assignment characteristics of students in classroom c(t, y)
are uncorrelated both with the characteristics of students in c(t, y+1) and with the teacher’s
true effect qt – then the bias in ˆ btyc(t,y) will be uncorrelated from one year to the next. A
decomposition of ˆ b into permanent teacher components and transitory components – a regres-
sion of ˆ btyc onto teacher indicators – would yield unbiased estimates of the permanent teacher
components qt. Alternatively, the variance of qt across teachers can be estimated from the



















By the assumptions above, the ﬁnal three terms are all zero. This sort of decomposition has
been used by Hanushek et al. (2005) and Kane and Staiger (2008), among others.
This strategy relies crucially on the assumption that the assignments are uncorrelated across
years. If some teachers are repeatedly assigned students with high expected gains that are not






whether assignments are in fact uncorrelated across years, I use students who were in 5th grade
in 2000 to estimate a regression of 5th grade gains on all prior scores, absorbing 5th grade
classroom indicators. This resembles the saturated VAM used above, but it excludes classroom
indicators from prior grades. Using the coefﬁcients from this regression, I form predicted 5th
grade gains for each 5th grade student in both 2000 and 2001, then average these to the class-
room level. These mean predicted gains represent bias in single-cohort estimates of VAM1. I
also residualize the predicted gains against 4th grade scores to obtain the bias in VAM2. I then
correlate the average predicted gains (or residual gains) of a teacher’s students in 2000 with
those for the same teacher’s students in 2001.
36In each VAM and in each subject, these cross-cohort correlations are positive and highly
statistically signiﬁcant. Evidently, teachers who are assigned good students in one year are
typicallyassignedbetter-than-average studentsthenextyear as well. Thus, whiledatafollowing
teachers for several years may have somevalue for reducing bias from non-random assignments
– the (observable) quality of a teacher’s students is not perfectly correlated over time – the
assumptions that would support simple corrections are not satisﬁed in the North Carolina data.
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41Figure 1: Comparison of VAM1 and VAM2 for 4th grade teacher effects to estimates of 4th
grade teachers’ effects on 5th grade scores from the saturated VAM


























































































Notes: The graphs show scatterplots of 4th grade teachers’ estimated effects on 4th grade gains
from VAM1 and VAM2 (vertical axes) against effects on 5th grade scores computed from a sat-
urated VAM that controls for all past teachers and scores (horizontal axes). Teacher effects are
normalized to mean zero within each school. Dashed lines show the 20th and 80th percentile
of the estimated effects. Each panel shows the correlation between the two sets of estimates
(weighted by the number of students taught, but not adjusted for sampling error), plus the frac-
tion of teachers who are assigned to the top and bottom quintiles by the cumulative saturated
model who are also assigned to these quintiles by VAM1 and VAM2.
42Table 1.  Summary statistics
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
# of students 99,071 60,740 23,415
# of schools 1,269 868 598
1 5th grade teacher 122 0 0
2 5th grade teacher 168 207 122
3-5 5th grade teachers 776 602 440
>5 5th grade teacher 203 59 36
# of 5th grade classrooms 4,876 3,040 2,116
# of 5th grade classrooms w/ valid teacher match 3,315 3,040 2,116
Female 49% 50% 51%
Black 29% 28% 23%
Other non-white 8% 7% 6%
Consistent student record 99% 100% 100%
Complete test score record, G4-5 88% 99% 100%
Complete test score record, G3-5 81% 91% 100%
Complete test score record, G2-5 72% 80% 100%
Changed schools between G3 and G5 30% 27% 0%
Valid teacher assignment in grade 3 68% 78% 100%
Valid teacher assignment in grade 4 70% 86% 100%
Valid teacher assignment in grade 5 72% 100% 100%
Fr. of students in G5 class in same G4 class 0.22 [0.19] 0.22 [0.17] 0.30 [0.19]
Fr. of students in G5 class in same G3 class 0.15 [0.15] 0.15 [0.13] 0.28 [0.18]
Math scores 3rd grade (beginning of year) 0.11 [0.97] 0.14 [0.96] 0.20 [0.96]
3rd grade (end of year) 0.09 [0.94] 0.11 [0.94] 0.19 [0.91]
4th grade (end of year) 0.04 [0.97] 0.07 [0.97] 0.20 [0.93]
5th grade (end of year) 0.00 [1.00] 0.09 [0.98] 0.20 [0.94]
3rd grade gain -0.02 [0.70] -0.02 [0.69] 0.00 [0.69]
4th grade gain -0.02 [0.58] -0.01 [0.58] 0.01 [0.56]
5th grade gain -0.01 [0.55] 0.01 [0.55] -0.01 [0.53]
Reading scores 3rd grade (beginning of year) 0.08 [0.98] 0.12 [0.98] 0.17 [0.98]
3rd grade (end of year) 0.08 [0.95] 0.11 [0.94] 0.19 [0.91]
4th grade (end of year) 0.04 [0.98] 0.07 [0.97] 0.18 [0.93]
5th grade (end of year) 0.00 [1.00] 0.07 [0.97] 0.17 [0.94]
3rd grade gain 0.01 [0.76] 0.00 [0.75] 0.01 [0.75]
4th grade gain -0.02 [0.59] -0.02 [0.59] 0.00 [0.57]
5th grade gain -0.01 [0.59] 0.00 [0.58] -0.02 [0.57]
Notes:  Summary statistics are computed over all available observations.  Test scores are standardized 
using all 3rd graders in 1999, 4th graders in 2000, and 5th graders in 2001, respectively, regardless of 
grade progress.  "Population" in Columns 1-2 is students enrolled in 5th grade in 2001, merged to 3rd and 
4th grade records (if present) for the same students in 1999 and 2000, respectively.  Columns 3-4 describe 
the base sample discussed in the text; it excludes students with missing 4th and 5th grade test scores, 
students without valid 5th grade teacher matches, 5th grade classes with fewer than 12 sample students, 
and schools with only one 5th grade class.  Columns 5-6 further restrict the sample to students with non-
missing scores in grades 3-5 (plus the 3rd grade beginning-of-year tests) and valid teacher assignments in 
each grade, at schools with multiple classes in each school in each grade and without perfect collinearity of 
classroom assignments in different grades.
Population Base sample Most restricted 
sampleTable 2.  Correlations of test scores and score gains across grades 
N
Mean SD Math Reading Math Reading
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Math scores
G5 0.02 1.00 1 0.78 0.29 0.08 70,740
G4 0.07 0.97 0.84 0.73 -0.27 -0.07 61,535
G3 0.09 0.95 0.80 0.70 -0.02 -0.03 57,382
G3 pretest 0.08 0.97 0.71 0.64 0.00 -0.03 50,661
Reading scores
G5 0.01 1.00 0.78 1 0.10 0.31 70,078
G4 0.06 0.97 0.73 0.82 -0.05 -0.29 61,535
G3 0.09 0.95 0.70 0.78 -0.01 -0.05 57,344
G3 pretest 0.08 0.99 0.59 0.65 0.00 -0.05 50,629
Math gains
G4-G5 0.01 0.55 0.29 0.10 1 0.25 61,349
G3-G4 -0.01 0.58 0.11 0.07 -0.41 -0.07 56,171
G2-G3 0.02 0.70 0.08 0.05 -0.02 0.01 50,615
Reading gains
G4-G5 0.00 0.58 0.08 0.31 0.25 1 60,987
G3-G4 -0.02 0.59 0.08 0.10 -0.08 -0.41 56,159
G2-G3 0.02 0.75 0.09 0.10 -0.01 0.02 50,558
Notes:  Each statistic is calculated using the maximal possible sample of valid student records 
with observations on all necessary scores and normal grade progress between the relevant 
grades.  Column 7 lists the sample size for each row variable; correlations use smaller samples 
for which the column variable is also available.  Italicized correlations are not different from zero 
at the 5% level.
Correlations
5th grade score 5th grade gain
Summary 
statisticsTable 3.  Evaluation of the gain score VAM
Math Reading Math Reading Math Reading Math Reading
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Standard deviation of teacher coefficients
5th grade teacher
Unadjusted SD 0.179 0.160 0.134 0.142 0.197 0.181 0.151 0.168
Adjusted SD 0.149 0.113 0.077 0.084 0.163 0.126 0.090 0.105
p-value <0.01 <0.01 0.02 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 0.03 <0.01
4th grade teacher
Unadjusted SD 0.188 0.181 0.220 0.193
Adjusted SD 0.150 0.125 0.182 0.140
p-value <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
nn nn yyy y
# of students 55,142 55,142 55,142 55,142 40,661 40,661 40,661 40,661
# of 5th grade teachers 3,038 3,038 3,038 3,038 2,761 2,761 2,761 2,761
# of schools 868 868 868 868 783 783 783 783
R2 0.195 0.100 0.132 0.086 0.297 0.176 0.254 0.174
Adjusted R2 0.148 0.047 0.081 0.033 0.203 0.066 0.154 0.064
Notes:  Sample for Columns 1-4 includes students from the base sample (see text) with non-missing 
scores in each subject in grades 3-5.  Columns 5-8 exclude students without valid 4th grade teacher 
matches and those who switched schools between 4th and 5th grade. Adjustments and p-values are 
based on heteroskedasticity-robust variances.
4th grade gain
Exclude invalid 4th grade 
teacher assignments & 
5th grade movers?
5th grade gain 4th grade gain 5th grade gainTable 4.  Evaluation of the lagged score VAM
Math Reading Math Reading Math Reading Math Reading
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Teacher coefficients
5th grade teacher
Unadjusted SD 0.176 0.150 0.120 0.129 0.191 0.169 0.138 0.150
Adjusted SD 0.150 0.109 0.067 0.076 0.161 0.121 0.079 0.091
p-value <0.01 <0.01 0.04 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 0.16 <0.01
4th grade teacher
Unadjusted SD 0.160 0.162 0.182 0.175
Adjusted SD 0.121 0.109 0.142 0.126
p-value <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
Continuous controls
4th grade math score -0.317 0.239 0.368 -0.213 -0.292 0.255 0.332 -0.229
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
4th grade reading score 0.195 -0.383 -0.218 0.380 0.189 -0.387 -0.206 0.379
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
nn nn yy yy
# of students 55,142 55,142 55,142 55,142 40,661 40,661 40,661 40,661
# of 5th grade teachers 3,038 3,038 3,038 3,038 2,761 2,761 2,761 2,761
# of schools 868 868 868 868 783 783 783 783
R2 0.313 0.249 0.274 0.237 0.385 0.315 0.354 0.307
Adjusted R2 0.273 0.206 0.231 0.193 0.302 0.224 0.268 0.215
Notes:  Samples correspond to those in Table 3.  Adjustments, p-values, and standard errors are robust 
to heteroskedasticity.
4th grade gain
Exclude invalid 4th grade 
teacher assignments & 5th 
grade movers?
5th grade gain 4th grade gain 5th grade gainTable 5.  Gain score VAM with student fixed effects:  Correlated random effects estimates
3rd grade 4th grade Corr((1),(2)) 3rd grade 4th grade Corr((4),(5))
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unrestricted model
Standard deviation of teacher effects, adjusted
5th grade teacher 0.135 0.099 -0.04 0.144 0.123 -0.06
4th grade teacher 0.136 0.193 -0.07 0.160 0.163 -0.08
3rd grade teacher 0.228 0.166 -0.36 0.183 0.145 -0.24
Fit statistics
R2 0.314 0.376 0.245 0.284
Adjusted R2 0.129 0.209 0.042 0.092
Constant coefficients restricted model (OMD)
Ratio, effect on G4 / effect on G3




Scalar coefficients restricted model (OMD)
Ratio, effect on G4 / effect on G3




Notes:  N=25,974.  Students who switched schools between 3rd and 5th grade, who are missing test scores in 
3rd or 4th grade (or on the 3rd grade beginning-of-year tests), or who lack valid teacher assignments in any 
grade 3-5 are excluded.  Schools with only one included teacher per grade or where teacher indicators are 













<0.01Math Reading Math Reading
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Standard deviation of 5th grade teachers' estimated effects
Unadjusted for sampling error 0.203 0.189 0.197 0.176
Adjusted for sampling error 0.162 0.127 0.162 0.121
SD of 5th grade teachers' estimated effects from saturated specification
Unadjusted for sampling error 0.206 0.200 0.206 0.200
Adjusted for sampling error 0.172 0.148 0.172 0.148
SD of bias in simple VAMs relative to the saturated specification
Unadjusted for sampling error 0.118 0.130 0.097 0.106
Adjusted for sampling error 0.060 0.054 0.037 0.028
Notes:  N=23,415.
VAM1 VAM2
Table 6.  Magnitude of bias in VAM1 and VAM2 relative to a saturated specification 
that controls for all past observablesTable 7.  Persistence of teacher effects in VAMs with lagged teachers
Math Reading Math Reading
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cumulative effect of 4th grade teachers over two years
Standard deviation of 4th grade teacher effects, adjusted
on 4th grade scores 0.184 0.150 0.188 0.140
on 5th grade scores 0.108 0.118 0.118 0.110
Correlation(effect on 4th grade, 
   effect on 5th grade), adjusted 0.455 0.413 0.511 0.334
Cumulative effect of 3rd grade teachers over three years
Standard deviation of 3rd grade teacher effects, adjusted
on 3rd grade scores 0.218 0.172 0.209 0.167
on 4th grade scores 0.136 0.126 0.120 0.130
on 5th grade scores 0.185 0.199 0.129 0.147
Correlation(effect on 3rd grade, 
   effect on 5th grade), adjusted 0.395 0.341 0.450 0.447
VAM1 VAM2Appendix Table A1.  Construction of analytical samples
Require student data in grades
Require teacher links in grades
N% N % N%
Base sample 60,740 100% 60,740 100% 60,740 100%
Excluded for
Missing record 3,772 6% 3,772 6% 3,772 6%
Missing test scores 1,825 3% 1,466 2% 5,226 9%
Changed schools 0 -- 7,181 12% 15,083 25%
Missing/invalid teacher match 0 -- 6,497 11% 9,400 15%
Only student in class 1 0% 10 0% 110 0%
Only class in school 0 -- 384 1% 556 1%
Collinearity 0 -- 769 1% 619 1%
Final sample 55,142 40,661 25,974
4, 5
Sample A Sample B Sample C
Tables 3-4, 
Cols 1-4








3, 4, 51 2 3 4 5+ 2+ Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Base sample
# of students 1,515 6,032 12,508 12,441 14,717 45,698 47,213
# of schools 109 206 268 197 164 835 944
Fr. of 5th grade classmates 
who were in the same 4th 
grade class 1.00 0.52 0.35 0.27 0.21 0.31 0.33
Schools with perfect collinearity
# of students 1,515 600 402 293 191 1,486 3,001
# of schools 109 35 16 7 4 62 171
Exclude schools with perfect collinearity
# of students 5,432 12,106 12,148 14,526 44,212 44,212
# of schools 171 252 190 160 773 773
Fr. of 5th grade classmates 
who were in the same 4th 
grade class 0.51 0.35 0.27 0.20 0.30 0.30
Number of 4th grade classes at school
Notes:  A school has "perfect collinearity" if the J4 indicators for 4th grade teachers and the J5 
indicators for 5th grade teachers together have rank less than J4 + J5 - 1.
Appendix Table A2.  Average fraction of 5th grade classmates who were in the same 4th 
grade class5th grade 4th grade 5th grade 4th grade 3rd grade 4th grade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
5th grade teacher
MA degree -0.05 -1.49 -0.75 -0.74 2.20 -1.12
(1.30) (0.99) (1.30) (0.90) (1.43) (1.04)
Experience 0.09 0.05 0.07 0.06 -0.04 -0.02
(0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05)
1(Experience < 2) -5.35 -2.87 -5.95 -2.02 3.65 -4.13
(1.88) (1.55) (1.84) (1.41) (2.19) (1.61)
Praxis score 1.50 1.32 2.26 0.41 -1.03 1.03
(0.80) (0.61) (0.77) (0.54) (0.82) (0.62)
4th grade teacher
MA degree -1.93 2.83 -1.19 1.92 0.67 3.25
(1.30) (1.53) (1.12) (1.23) (1.33) (1.62)
Experience -0.10 0.07 -0.09 0.05 -0.07 0.13
(0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08)
1(Experience < 2) 5.21 -5.77 3.76 -3.96 1.06 -5.89
(1.75) (2.00) (1.57) (1.66) (2.09) (2.16)
Praxis score -1.48 2.18 -0.72 1.29 0.17 2.53
(0.76) (0.89) (0.65) (0.72) (0.81) (0.94)
3rd grade teacher




1(Experience < 2) -0.58 -1.04
(3.05) (2.24)
Praxis score 0.34 -0.05
(1.07) (0.80)





N 20,251 20,251 20,251 20,251 18,239 18,239
R2 0.147 0.142 0.264 0.278 0.105 0.145
p-value, G5 teacher 
coeffs. = 0 <0.01 0.02 <0.01 0.11 0.13 0.04
Restricted specification, G5 teacher effects are equal in G3, G4 models
p-value   0.02
Restricted specification, G5 teacher effects are proportional in G3, G4 models
Ratio, effect on G4 to effect on G3 -0.92
p-value for overid. test 0.81
Note: Dependent variables in each column are math gain scores in the relevant grade, multiplied by 100.
Appendix Table C1.  Models for the effects of teacher observable characteristics on math gains
VAM1 VAM2
VAM3 (correlated 
random effects)